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1 Introduction
Recent contributions in welfare economics have suggested new social welfare relations
for the purpose of evaluating infinite utility streams representing the welfare levels
of an infinite and countable number of generations. In particular, Basu and Mitra
(2007a) extend the utilitarian ordering on a finite dimensional Euclidian space to
the infinite dimensional case. Also non-additive theories have been defended, and
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) extend the leximin ordering. Both these
social welfare relations are incomplete. Still, they may be effective in the sense of
selecting a small set of optimal or maximal elements for a given class of feasible
infinite utility streams. Suggestions have also come from the philosophical literature
(e.g., Vallentyne and Kagan, 1997; Lauwers and Vallentyne, 2004), sticking to finitely
additive moral value theories, but addressing the issue of ranking worlds with an
infinite number of “locations of values”. These may represent “times” and hence be
naturally ordered, or “people” for which no natural ordering can be assigned.
It is easy to construct pairs of infinite utility streams incomparable according
to the criteria of Basu and Mitra (2007a) and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
(2007), but where it is clear that the one infinite stream is socially preferred to the
other both from a utilitarian and egalitarian point of view. To illustrate, consider
the following two streams:
u : 1 12
1
4
1
8
1
16
1
32 . . .
1
2n−1 . . .
v : −1 1 12 14 18 116 . . . 12n−2 . . .
It is intuitively clear that u is socially preferred to v from a utilitarian perspective
since the sum of utility differences between u and v is unconditionally convergent
and converges to 1. Likewise, it is intuitively clear that u is socially preferred to v
from an egalitarian perspective since the minimal utility of v (= −1) is smaller than
the greatest lower bound for the utility of u (= 0). Still, according to the criteria of
Basu and Mitra (2007a) and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) these streams
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are incomparable since there is no cofinite set (a subset of all generations with finite
complement) on which u equals or Pareto-dominates v. This motivates an investiga-
tion of social welfare relations for the evaluation of infinite utility streams which are
more complete than those proposed by Basu and Mitra (2007a) and Bossert, Spru-
mont and Suzumura (2007), while allowing for non-additive moral value theories
and different interpretations for the locations of values.
Extensions of utilitarian and leximin orderings to the infinite-dimensional case
are normally required to satisfy the axioms of Finite Anonymity (ensuring equal
treatment of generations) and Strong Pareto (ensuring sensitivity for the interests
for each generation). Recent work by Lauwers (2010) and Zame (2007) confirms
the following conjecture, suggested by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003): no definable
complete and transitive binary relation on the set of infinite utility streams can
be proved to satisfy the axioms of Finite Anonymity and Strong Pareto. In this
sense, no complete social welfare relation satisfying these axioms can be “explicitly
described” (see Zame, 2007, Theorem 4).1 We will here consider social welfare
relations satisfying Finite Anonymity and Strong Pareto that can be “explicitly
described”, and hence completeness is an unreachable goal.
However, there might be reasons—other than issues of explicit description—why
one should refrain from seeking excessive comparability. To make this argument,
consider the following two infinite utility streams:
x : 32 0 1 0 1 0 . . . 1 0 . . .
y : 0 1 0 1 0 1 . . . 0 1 . . .
When overtaking (Atsumi, 1965; von Weizsa¨cker, 1965) is applied to the utilitarian
or leximin ordering (see Asheim and Tungodden, 2004), then x is strictly preferred
to y since the finite head of x is preferred to the finite head of y at all locations.
1By applying Szpilrajn’s Lemma (whose proof uses the Axiom of Choice), Svensson (1980) has
shown that complete social welfare relations satisfying Finite Anonymity and Strong Pareto exist.
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This conclusion crucially depends on the sequencing of the locations, as permuting
odd and even locations for both x and y makes the streams incomparable.
The strict ranking of x over y can be made robust to such re-sequencing by
adding Fixed-step Anonymity (Lauwers, 1997; Mitra and Basu, 2007) to overtaking
(as done by Kamaga and Kojima, 2009b). Then y becomes indifferent to
z : 1 0 1 0 1 . . . 0 1 . . .
and thus by Strong Pareto and transitivity strictly inferior to x. However, imposing
Fixed-step Anonymity comes at the cost of Koopmans’ (1960) Stationarity axiom
(in the sense that preference over future utilities should not depend on present utility
if both streams have the same present utility). To see this, consider
(0,y) : 0 0 1 0 1 0 . . . 1 0 . . .
(0, z) : 0 1 0 1 0 1 . . . 0 1 . . .
Fixed-step Anonymity, under which y and z are socially indifferent, combined with
Strong Pareto forces us to conclude that (0, z) is socially preferred to (0,y), thereby
contradicting Stationarity.
Furthermore, even in conjunction with Fixed-step Anonymity, overtaking is de-
pendent on sequencing: By allowing for permutations that are not of the fixed-step
kind, there exists an infinite permutation matrix P such that
Px : 0 0 32 0 1 . . . 0 1 . . .
Py : 1 1 0 1 0 . . . 1 0 . . .
implying that Py is socially preferred to Px by both the utilitarian and leximin
overtaking criterion, thereby inverting the original ranking.2
2The concepts of a permutation and a permutation matrix are introduced in Section 2.2. The
matrix P moves location 2 to location 1, all other even locations two periods backwards, and all
odd locations two periods forwards.
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These examples show that overtaking does not satisfy axioms of Relative Anony-
mity, in the sense the ranking of two streams should not change when the same
permutation of locations is applied to both streams. In its traditional form, over-
taking does not satisfy the axiom of Fixed-step Relative Anonymity, where ‘fixed-
step’ reflects that only fixed-step permutations are considered. Even in conjunction
with Fixed-step Anonymity, overtaking does not satisfy the axiom of Strong Relative
Anonymity, where ‘strong’ reflects that all infinite permutations are considered.
In this paper we will insist on the axioms of Stationarity and Strong Relative
Anonymity. An argument for Stationarity is that it is necessary for time-consistency
if social preferences are assumed to be time-invariant.
An argument for Strong Relative Anonymity is, as discussed by Vallentyne and
Kagan (1997), that there is no natural order; in this case the axiom coincides with
Lauwers and Vallentyne’s (2004, p. 317) Isomorphism Invariance. This argument
may also apply in the intergenerational setting, where the generations follow each
other in sequence. An interesting case is where the utilities of people within each
generation are not aggregated into a single number,3 but where the elements of the
stream correspond to individual utilities. With an infinite number of individuals
within each generation, the stream of individual utilities cannot have a natural or-
der. With a finite population, there is no natural ordering of people within each
generation. Even in the case where the elements of the stream represents genera-
tional utilities, one can argue that the order in which generations are counted should
not matter for the ranking of streams if the generations are treated equally.
Relative Anonymity (in the sense the ranking of two streams does not change
when the same permutation of locations is applied to both streams) is weaker than
ordinary Anonymity (where a permutation is applied to only one stream). To il-
lustrate: the incomplete social welfare relation generated by Strong Pareto alone
3See d’Aspremont (2007) for the assumptions required to reduce the welfare of each generation
to a single number.
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satisfies Strong Relative Anonymity, but fails to satisfy even the weakest form of
Anonymity, Finite Anonymity, because Pareto-dominance can vanish when two ele-
ments of the one stream (only) are permuted.
The utilitarian and leximin social welfare relations proposed by Basu and Mitra
(2007a) and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) respectively satisfy both Sta-
tionarity and Strong Relative Anonymity. It is the purpose of the present paper to
expand the asymmetric parts of these binary relations without compromising Sta-
tionarity and Strong Relative Anonymity. In particular, we will present utilitarian
and leximin social welfare relations that rank u strictly above v, while deeming x
and y (and y and z, and (0,y) and (0, z), and Px and Py) incomparable.
A simple but important fact is that, for comparing infinite utility streams, all
welfare criteria, whether the utilitarian criterion of Basu and Mitra (2007b), the lex-
imin criterion of Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007), as well as other utilitarian
criteria such as overtaking and catching-up introduced by von Weizsa¨cker (1965) and
Atsumi (1965), and the leximin criteria defined in Asheim and Tungodden (2004),
use an infinite sequence of the standard finite version of either the utilitarian or the
leximin social welfare ordering.
Using this fact, and a known property of these respective sequences, namely that
of being “proliferating” (to impose the criterion for any finite number of individuals,
it is sufficient to impose it in situations where only two individuals are involved),
all these criteria can be given a “generalized” formulation. This generalized formu-
lation is meaningful for any given proliferating sequence of social welfare relations
defined on finite utility streams (and usually assumed to satisfy some Anonymity
and Pareto conditions). The notion of a proliferating sequence was introduced for
the analysis of generalized versions of infinite-dimensional SWRs by d’Aspremont
(2007). It emphasizes the fact that value judgments made in the social evaluation
of the welfare of the individuals within a generation, and in particular within the
present generation, are binding in the evaluation of the welfare of all generations.
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Here we suggest a version of the overtaking criterion within this general approach
to the evaluation of infinite utility streams. We call this generalized time-invariant
overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infi-
nite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and
transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. Our general analy-
sis specializes in a straightforward manner to the utilitarian and leximin cases. We
establish as a general result (stated in Theorem 1) that generalized time-invariant
overtaking satisfies Stationarity and Strong Relative Anonymity. We also note that
the criterion ranks u strictly above v. Moreover, we provide methods for determin-
ing the asymmetric and symmetric parts in the special cases of the utilitarian and
leximin time-invariant overtaking criteria.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains preliminaries, Section
3 presents the concept of proliferating sequences, and Section 4 reviews different
kinds of “generalized criteria”. Section 5 defines and investigates the properties of
generalized time-invariant overtaking, and Section 6 specializes this concept to the
utilitarian and leximin cases. The concluding Section 7 contains a general analysis
of the properties of pairs of utility streams that our criterion cannot compare, and
a discussion of the close relationship between our analysis and the work Vallentyne
and Kagan (1997) and Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004) in the utilitarian case.4
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Definitions
Let N denote the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...} and R the set of real numbers.
Let X denote the set Y |N|, where Y ⊆ R is an interval satisfying [0, 1] ⊆ Y . We let
X be the domain of utility sequences (also referred to as “utility streams” or “utility
profiles”). Thus, we write x ≡ (x1, x2, . . .) ∈ X iff xn ∈ Y for all n ∈ N. Usually,
4We thank the referee for pointing out this close relationship.
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xn is interpreted as the utility of generation n, but more generally as the utility of
individual n belonging to some generation. No natural order will be assumed. For
x, y ∈ X we will write x ≥ y iff xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x > y iff x ≥ y and x 6= y.
Whenever we write about subsets M , N of N, we will be dealing with subsets
of finite cardinality, entailing that N\M , N\N are cofinite sets (i.e., subsets of N
which complements are finite). For all x ∈ X and any N ⊂ N, we will write x as
(xN ,xN\N ). We will denote vectors (finite as well as infinite dimensional) by bold
letters; example are x, y, etc. The components of a vector will be denoted by normal
font. Negation of a statement is indicated by the logical quantifier ¬.
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a reflexive and transitive binary relation de-
fined on X (and denoted %) or Y |M | for some M ⊂ N (and denoted %M ). A social
welfare order (SWO) is a complete SWR.
An SWR %′ is a subrelation to SWR %′′ if for all x, y ∈ X, (a) x ∼′ y⇒ x ∼′′ y
and (b) x ′ y⇒ x ′′ y.
2.2 Permutations
A permutation pi is a one-to-one map from N onto N. For any x ∈ X and a permu-
tation pi, we write x ◦ pi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . ) ∈ X. Permutations can be represented
by a permutation matrix, P = (pij)i,j∈N, which is an infinite matrix satisfying:
(1) For each i ∈ N, pij(i) = 1 for some j(i) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all j 6= j(i).
(2) For each j ∈ N, pi(j)j = 1 for i(j) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all i 6= i(j).
Given any permutation pi, there is a permutation matrix P such that for x ∈ X,
x◦pi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . ) can also be written as Px in the usual matrix multiplication.
Conversely, given any permutation matrix P , there is a permutation pi defined by
pi = Pa, where a = (1, 2, 3, . . . ). The set of all permutations is denoted by P.
A finite permutation pi is a permutation such that there is some N ⊂ N with
pi(i) = i for all i /∈ N . Thus, a finite permutation matrix has pii = 1 for all i /∈ N
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for some N ⊂ N. The set of all finite permutations is denoted by F .
Given a permutation matrix P ∈ P and n ∈ N, we denote the n × n matrix
(pij)i,j∈{1,...,n} by P (n). Let
S = {P ∈ P | there is some k ∈ N such that, for each n ∈ N,
P (nk) is a finite dimensional permutation matrix}
denote the set of fixed-step permutations. It is easily checked that this is a group
(with respect to matrix multiplication) of cyclic permutations.5
2.3 Axioms of Anonymity and Pareto
In this subsection we introduce the basic axioms that are repeatedly used in the rest
of the paper. The first set of axioms pertains to SWRs defined on a finite-dimensional
space, whereas the latter set is on the space of infinite utility streams.
Let %M be an SWR defined on Y |M |. Throughout we will as assume that %M
satisfies the following condition as a minimal requirement. It is an anonymity condi-
tion where the same permutation applies to the two utility vectors. Hence, we call it
“relative anonymity”. In the present intergenerational context it can be interpreted
as a time invariance property, reflecting that no natural order is assumed.
Axiom m-I (m-Relative Anonymity) For all xM , yM , uN , vN ∈ Y m with M =
{i1, i2, ..., im} ⊂ N and N = {j1, j2, ..., jm} ⊂ N satisfying |M | = |N | = m ≥ 2, if
there exists a finite permutation pi : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m} such that xipi(k) = ujk
and yipi(k) = vjk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then xM %M yM iff uN %N vN .
By satisfying m-I, %M depends only on the dimension |M |. We will henceforth
write %m for an SWR on Y m, thereby signifying that the SWR satisfies m-I.
5The permutation pi is cyclic if for each ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0. . . . ) (with 1 at the ith place) there
exists a k ∈ N such that pik(ei) = ei. A class of cyclic permutations is not necessarily a group,
while P is a group which does not contain only cyclic permutations.
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It is useful to comparem-I to the usual anonymity condition where a permutation
is applied to the one utility stream only.
Axiom m-A (m-Anonymity) For all a, b ∈ Y m with m ≥ 2, if a is a permutation
of b, then a ∼m b.
Since %m is transitive, m-A is equivalent to having a ∼m b whenever there exists
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that ai = bj , aj = bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i, j.
The m-Pareto Principle (a %Pm b if and only if a ≥ b) illustrates that m-I does
not imply m-A. However, as originally shown by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977,
Lemma 4), the two axioms are equivalent if %m is complete.
Lemma 1 If %m with m ≥ 2 is complete, then %m satisfies m-A.
Proof. Assume that %m is complete (where the notation entails that the SWR
satisfies m-I). Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a, b ∈ Y m with
ai = bj , aj = bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i, j such that ¬(a ∼m b). Since %m
is complete, we may w.l.o.g. assume that a m b. However, by permuting the
ith and jth element of both a and b and invoking m-I, we obtain b m a, which
contradicts a m b. Hence, a ∼m b whenever there exists i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that ai = bj , aj = bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i, j.
The other kind of basic axiom is the Pareto condition.
Axiom m-P (m-Pareto) For all a, b ∈ Y m with m ≥ 2, if a > b, then a m b.
Clearly, since %m is transitive, m-P is equivalent to having a m b whenever there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that ai > bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i. As a matter of
notation, if it is clear from the context that an axiom on finite dimension is invoked,
then we will drop the letter m from its abbreviation.
Let % be an SWR defined onX. Consider the following versions of the anonymity
and Pareto axioms on %. Let Q be some fixed group of permutations equaling F , S
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or P, corresponding to the terms “Finite”, “Fixed-step” and “Strong” respectively
in the names of the axioms below.
Axiom QI (Finite/Fixed-step/Strong Relative Anonymity) For all x, y ∈ X and
all P ∈ Q, x % y iff Px % Py.
Axiom QA (Finite/Fixed-step/Strong Anonymity) For all x ∈ X and all P ∈ Q,
x ∼ Px.
Axiom FP (Finite Pareto) For all x, y ∈ X with some subset N ⊂ N such that
xi = yi for all i ∈ N\N , if x > y, then x  y.
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto) For all x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then x  y.
Clearly, since % is transitive, FA is equivalent to having x ∼ y whenever there
exist i, j ∈ N such that xi = yj , xj = yi and xk = yk for all k 6= i, j. Likewise,
FP is equivalent to having x  y whenever there exists i ∈ N such that xi > yi
and xk = yk for all k 6= i. This is what Basu and Mitra (2007b) refer to as Weak
Dominance; hence, FP coincides with Weak Dominance. Note that for Q = F , S or
P, QA implies QI, while the converse is not true for incomplete infinite-dimensional
SWRs. For an analysis of these issues and more generally on comparability of a social
welfare evaluation in the intergenerational context we refer to Mabrouk (2008). It
is also well-known that PA cannot be combined with SP, while SA can (since it is
a group of cyclic permuations, cf. Mitra and Basu, 2007).
3 Proliferating sequences
Many well-known finite-dimensional SWRs form proliferating sequences. The struc-
ture imposed by this concept on a sequence of finite-dimensional SWR enables the
extension to an infinite-dimensional SWR to be analyzed at a generalized level,
without considering the specific nature of the finite-dimensional counterpart. Fur-
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thermore, it allows infinite-dimensional SWRs to be defined solely on the basis of
the 2-dimensional version of the underlying finite-dimensional SWR.
An infinite-dimensional SWR % extends the finite-dimensional SWR %m if, for
all M ⊂ N with |M | = m and all x, y ∈ X with xi = yi for every i ∈ N\M ,
xM m yM implies x  y, and xM ∼m yM implies x ∼ y.
Definition 1 A sequence of SWRs, {%∗m}∞m=2, is proliferating if any SWR % that
extends %∗2 also extends %∗m for every m ≥ 2.
The following result implies that the m-Grading Principle (a %Sm b iff there
exists a permutation c of b such that a ≥ c) is proliferating.6
Lemma 2 (i) If %2 is an SWR on Y 2 that satisfies A, and % is an SWR on X
that extends %2, then % satisfies FA.
(ii) If %2 is an SWR on Y 2 that satisfies P, and % is an SWR on X that extends
%2, then % satisfies FP.
Proof. (i) Let x, y ∈ X and for some i, j ∈ N (i 6= j), xi = yj , xj = yi and
xk = yk for all k 6= i, j. Set M = {i, j}. Since %2 satisfies A, xM ∼2 yM . By the
fact that xk = yk for all k ∈ N\M and % extends %2, x ∼ y.
(ii) Let x,y ∈ X and for some i ∈ N, xi > yi and xk = yk for all k 6= i. Set
M = {i, k} for some k 6= i. Since %2 satisfies P, xM 2 yM . By the fact that
xj = yj for all j ∈ N\M and % extends %2, x  y.
The utilitarian and leximin SWOs, which will be defined and analyzed in Section
6, are other important examples of proliferating sequences. In the case of such
6The Grading Principle was introduced by Suppes (1966) and further analyzed by Sen (1970),
Kolm (1972) and Hammond (1976, 1979). Its proliferating property is mentioned by Sen (1976, fn
26) as suggested by Hammond as a step to derive the same property for Leximin. For a proof, see
Hammond (1979). The proof of d’Aspremont (1985, Lemma 3.1.1) can be immediately transposed
to Y m (in place of Rm).
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complete SWRs, the notion of proliferation yields added structure.7
Lemma 3 A proliferating sequence {%∗m}∞m=2 of SWOs satisfies:
(i) For all x, y ∈ X satisfying xi = yi for some i ∈ N\M , xM %∗|M | yM iff
xM∪{i} %∗|M |+1 yM∪{i}.
(ii) Assume that %∗m satisfies P for each m ≥ 2. For all x, y ∈ X satisfying that
there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∼∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M , xi = yi
for all i ∈ N\M .
Proof. (i) Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs, and let % extend
%∗2, implying that % extends %∗m for all m ≥ 2. Assume that xM %∗|M | yM and
xi = yi for some i ∈ N\M . Let z ∈ X be an arbitrarily chosen utility stream. Since
% extends %∗|M |, this implies (xM∪{i}, zN\(M∪{i})) % (yM∪{i}, zN\(M∪{i})). Suppose
xM∪{i} ≺∗|M |+1 yM∪{i}. Since % extends %∗|M |+1, this implies (xM∪{i}, zN\(M∪{i})) ≺
(yM∪{i}, zN\(M∪{i})), leading to a contradiction. Hence, ¬(xM∪{i} ≺∗|M |+1 yM∪{i}),
implying since the SWO %∗|M |+1 is complete that xM∪{i} %∗|M |+1 yM∪{i}. Likewise,
xM ∗|M | yM and xi = yi for some i ∈ N\M implies that xM∪{i} ∗|M |+1 yM∪{i},
thereby establishing the converse statement.
(ii) Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with, for each m ≥ 2, %∗m
satisfying P. Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∼∗|N | yN
for all N ⊇M . Suppose that xi 6= yi for some i ∈ N\M ; w.l.o.g. we can set xi > yi.
Since %∗|M |+1 satisfies P, it follows from part (i) that
xM∪{i} ∼∗|M |+1 (yM , xi) ∗|M |+1 yM∪{i} ,
contradicting that xM∪{i} ∼∗|M |+1 yM∪{i}. Hence, xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M .
7Sakai (2010) refers to property (i) of the following lemma as “independence”.
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4 Generalized criteria
In this section we review “generalized criteria”, namely infinite-dimensional SWRs
that extend finite-dimensional SWRs that are both complete and proliferating. We
first introduce two additional axioms on the space of infinite utility streams that
will be used to differentiate these generalized criteria and in the rest of the paper.
Axiom ST (Stationarity) For all x, y, u, v ∈ X with x1 = y1 and, for all i ∈ N,
ui = xi+1 and vi = yi+1, x % y iff u % v.
Axiom IPC (Time-Invariant Preference Continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there exists
M ⊂ N such that, for all N ⊇M , (xN ,yN\N )  y, then x  y.
Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with, for each m ≥ 2, %∗m
satisfying axiom P (while, by Lemma 1, axiom A follows from the assumption that
axiom I is satisfied). Let % extend %∗2, implying that % extends %∗m for all m ≥ 2.
For all M ⊂ N with |M | = m ≥ 2 and all x, y ∈ X with xi = yi for every
i ∈ N\M , xM %m yM iff x % y, since %∗m is complete. Hence, for all x, y ∈ X
and M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2, (xM ,xN\M ) % (yM ,xN\M ) iff (xM ,yN\M ) % (yM ,yN\M ).
Therefore, axiom IPC does not depend on the specification of the common elements
on N\N . Furthermore, axiom IPC is sufficient to ensure strict preference between
u and v of the introduction. To see this, note that if 1 ∈M , then, for any N ⊇M ,
uN Pareto-dominates some permutation of vN .
The following generalized criteria extend %∗m for every m ≥ 2.
• Equality on a cofinite set (introduced here). %∗ is the SWR defined by
x %∗ y iff there exists N ⊂ N such that xN %∗|N | yN and xN\N = yN\N .
• Equality or Pareto-dominance on a cofinite set (Basu and Mitra, 2007a;
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2007). %∗F is the SWR defined by
x %∗F y iff there exists N ⊂ N such that xN %∗|N | yN and xN\N ≥ yN\N .
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• Extended Anonymity (Banerjee, 2006; Kamaga and Kojima, 2009a). %∗S is
the SWR defined by
x %∗S y iff there exists P ∈ S such that x %∗F Py .
• Overtaking (Atsumi, 1965; von Weizsa¨cker, 1965) %∗O is the SWR defined by
x ∗O y iff there exists m ∈ N such that x{1,...,n} ∗n y{1,...,n} for all n ≥ m,
x ∼∗O y iff there exists m ∈ N such that x{1,...,n} ∼∗n y{1,...,n} for all n ≥ m.
• Fixed-step overtaking (Lauwers, 1997; Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003; Kam-
aga and Kojima, 2009b). %∗SO is the SWR defined by
x ∗SO y iff there exists k ∈ N such that x{1,...,nk} ∗nk y{1,...,nk} for all n ∈ N,
x ∼∗SO y iff there exists k ∈ N such that x{1,...,nk} ∼∗nk y{1,...,nk} for all n ∈ N.
The criteria, %∗, %∗F , %∗S , %∗O, and %∗SO, are infinite-dimensional SWRs that
illustrate the trade-offs between the axioms. By the definition of extension, %∗ is
a subrelation to any SWR extending %∗m for every m ≥ 2. Furthermore, %∗F is a
subrelation to each of %∗S and %∗O, and %∗S and %∗O are both subrelations to %∗SO.
All these SWRs satisfy FI and FA. Table 1 summarizes their properties in terms
of the remaining axioms, where “violated by” means that, for a given SWR in the
table, no alternative SWR to which this SWR is a subrelation satisfies the axiom.
This leads to the following observations: Going from %∗F to %∗O we pick up IPC, but
weaken PI all the way to FI. Going from %∗F to %∗SO we strengthen FA to SA and
pick up IPC, but must weaken PI to SI and drop ST. This leads to the question:
Is it possible to pick up IPC without weakening PI and dropping ST?8 We show
that this is indeed possible by means of generalized time-invariant overtaking.
8The (y, z) example of Section 1 illustrates the problems of strengthening FA to SA while
retaining ST. Mitra (2007) discusses the problem of combining ST with any kind of extended
anonymity. Here we show how the asymmetric part of %∗F can be expanded, while retaining ST.
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%∗SO
%∗O
%∗S
%∗F
%∗
SI PI SA PA SP ST IPC
+ + + + +
+ + − + +
+ − + − + −
− − + + +
+ − + − + − +
Table 1: Axioms satisfied (+) and violated (−) by various SWRs
5 A new criterion for infinite utility streams
We are now ready to state the definition of the generalized time-invariant overtaking
criterion. Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with %∗m satisfying
axiom P (while axiom A is implied by axiom I) for each m ≥ 2.9
Definition 2 (Generalized time-invariant overtaking) The generalized time-
invariant overtaking criterion %∗I generated by {%∗m}∞m=2 satisfies, for all x, y ∈ X,
x %∗I y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN %∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 1 Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with, for each m ≥
2, %∗m satisfying axiom P. Then:
(i) %∗I is an SWR that satisfies PI, FA, SP and ST.
(ii) An SWR % extends %∗2 and satisfies IPC iff %∗I is a subrelation to %.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we make use of the following lemmas.
9Definition 2 is formulated as a “catching up” criterion. However, Lemma 4 shows that a
formulation in terms of an “overtaking” criterion is equivalent, justify our terminology.
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Lemma 4 The SWR %∗I satisfies:
(i) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∗I y iff there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
(ii) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∼∗I y iff there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN ∼∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
Proof. (Only-if part of (i): x ∗I y only if there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2
such that xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M .) Assume x ∗I y that is, (a) x %∗I y and
(b) ¬(y %∗I x). By (a), there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN %∗|N | yN
for all N ⊇ M . Note that ¬(y %∗I x) implies that for any M ⊂ N there is some
M ′ ⊃ M such that xM ′ ∗|M ′| yM ′ . By way of contradiction, suppose that there
does not exist M ′′ ⊂ N such xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M ′′. In particular, since
then xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M does not hold, it follows from (a) that there exists
A ⊇ M such that xA ∼∗|A| yA. We claim that there exists B ⊂ N with A ∩ B = ∅
such that xA∪B ∗|A|+|B| yA∪B. That is, the statement: for all B ⊂ N with A∩B = ∅
we must have yA∪B %∗|A|+|B| xA∪B is false. This possibility is ruled out since if it
were correct, we would obtain y %∗I x, which is contradicted by (b).
Since we suppose that there does not exist M ′′ ⊂ N such xN ∗|N | yN for all
N ⊇M ′′, it does not hold that xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ A ∪B. Hence, by (a) there
exists C ⊂ N with (A ∪ B) ∩ C = ∅ such that xA∪B∪C ∼∗|A|+|B|+|C| yA∪B∪C . This
leads to the first indifference in (1), while the second strict preference in (1) follows
from Lemma 3(i):
yA∪B∪C ∼∗|A|+|B|+|C| xA∪B∪C ∗|A|+|B|+|C| (yA∪B,xC) . (1)
By transitivity we get (yA∪B,yC) ∗|A|+|B|+|C| (yA∪B,xC). So, yC ∗|C| xC . [If
¬(yC ∗|C| xC), then xC %∗|C| yC . By Lemma 3(i), we obtain (yA∪B,xC) %∗|A|+|B|+|C|
(yA∪B,yC).] We now get:
yA∪C ∗|A|+|C| (yA,xC) ∼∗|A|+|C| xA∪C %∗|A|+|C| yA∪C , (2)
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The first strict preference in (2) is a consequence of Lemma 3(i) and yC ∗|C| xC .
The second indifference in (2) is a consequence of Lemma 3(i) and xA ∼∗|A| yA. The
last weak preference in (2) follows from (a) and the fact that A ∪ C ⊃ M . So (2)
leads us to a contradiction.This completes the proof of the only-if part of (i).
(If part of (i): x ∗I y if there existsM ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∗|N | yN
for all N ⊇ M .) Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∗|N |
yN for all N ⊇ M . Then x %∗I y. By way of contradiction, suppose y %∗I x.
Then there exists M ′ ⊂ N with |M ′| ≥ 2 such that yN %∗|N | xN for all N ⊇ M ′.
For N ⊇ M ′ ∪M we must have xN ∗|N | yN and yN %∗|N | xN . This leads to a
contradiction. Hence, ¬(y %∗I x) and, consequently, x ∗I y.
(Only-if part of (ii): x ∼∗I y only if there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN ∼∗|N | yN for all N ⊇M . ) Let x ∼∗I y. Then there exists sets M ′,M ′′ ⊂ N such
that xN %∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M ′ and yN %∗|N | xN for all N ⊇ M ′′. Then for all
N ⊇M ′ ∪M ′′ we must have xN ∼∗|N | yN , as was required.
The if part of (ii) follows directly from the definition and we omit the details.
Lemma 5 The SWR %∗I satisfies PI, SP and ST.
Proof. (%∗I satisfies PI.) Let x,y ∈ X and P ∈ P. Assume x %∗I y. Let
pi : N → N be the equivalent representation of the infinite permutation matrix P .
Clearly pi is a one-to-one and onto function. Since x %∗I y there exists M ⊂ N
with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN %∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . Let the image of M under
the function pi be denoted by pi(M), that is pi(M) = {i ∈ N | there exists j ∈ M
such that pi(j) = i}. Now for N ⊇ pi(M), we must have pi−1(N) ⊇ M , where
pi−1 : N→ N is the inverse of pi. Since %∗m satisfies m-I for all m ≥ 2, we must have
for all N ⊇ pi(M), (Px)N %∗I (Py)N . Hence, x %∗I y implies Px %∗I Py for any
P ∈ P. The converse is established in a similar manner.
(%∗I satisfies SP.) Let x,y ∈ X satisfy x > y. Pick M ⊂ N such that xM 6= yM .
Since %∗m satisfies P for all m ≥ 2, we must have xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . By
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Lemma 4 (i) we can conclude x ∗I y.
(%∗I satisfies ST.) Let x, y, u, v ∈ X satisfy x1 = y1, and for all i ∈ N, ui = xi+1
and vi = yi+1. Assume x %∗I y. Hence, there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such
xN %∗|N | yN for allN ⊇M . ConstructM ′ as follows: M ′ = {i ∈ N | i+1 ∈M}, with
an arbitrary element added in if the number of elements inM ′ would otherwise be 1.
Consider any N ′ ⊆M ′, and construct N as follows: N = {i ∈ N | i− 1 ∈ N ′} ∪ {1}.
Since, by construction, N ⊇M , xN ∗|N | yN . By Lemma 3(i), xN\{1} ∗|N |−1 yN\{1}
since x1 = y1. Thus, uN ′ %∗|N |−1 vN ′ since %∗m satisfies m-I for all m. Hence,
x %∗I y implies u %∗I v. The converse is establish in a similar manner.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) It can be easily checked that %∗I is reflexive and
transitive provided that %∗m is reflexive and transitive for each m; hence, %∗I is an
SWR on X. The rest of part (i) follows directly from Lemma 2(i) and Lemma 5.
(Only-if part of (ii): An SWR % extends %∗2 and satisfies IPC only if %∗I is a
subrelation to %.) Let x, y ∈ X. If x ∗I y, then using Lemma 4 (i) we must have
that there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . For
all N ⊇M , since % extends %∗2 and {%∗m}∞m=2 is a proliferating sequence we obtain
(xN ,yN\N )  y. Now, by IPC, we have x  y. If x ∼∗I y, then by Lemma 4 (ii)
we must have that there exist M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN ∼∗|N | yN for all
N ⊇ M . By Lemma 3 (ii), we have xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M . Since % extends %∗2
and {%∗m}∞m=2 is a proliferating sequence we get x ∼ y.
(If part of (ii): An SWR % extends %∗2 and satisfies IPC if %∗I is a subrelation
to %.) We omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗2.
To show that % satisfies IPC, assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2
such that, for all N ⊇ M , (xN ,yN\N )  y. Since % extends %∗2 and {%∗m}∞m=2
is proliferating, it follows from the completeness of the SWO %∗m for every m that
xN ∗|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . Hence, x ∗I y by Lemma 4(i), and x  y since %∗I
is a subrelation to %. This shows that % satisfies condition IPC.
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6 Applications
In this section we study specific criteria based on particular proliferating sequences.
In particular, as the utilitarian SWO and the leximin SWO defined for pairs on
any subset of the m-dimensional Euclidean space define two proliferating sequences,
they lay the foundation for two specializations of the generalized time-invariant
overtaking criterion: utilitarian and leximin time-invariant overtaking. Furthermore,
we propose methods for determining the asymmetric and symmetric parts of the
utilitarian and leximin time-invariant overtaking criteria.
6.1 The Utilitarian Case
To state the definition of the utilitarian SWO defined on Y m we first introduce some
additional notation. For each N ⊂ N, where by our notational convention N is finite,
the partial sum
∑
i∈N xi is written as σ(xN ). Let {%Um}∞m=2 denote the sequence of
utilitarian SWOs, with each %Um defined on Y m. Formally, for all a, b ∈ Y m,
a %Um b iff σ(a) ≥ σ(b) .
In order to rely on a standard characterization of utilitarianism, we first state
the Translation Scale Invariance axiom for finite population social choice theory.
Axiom m-TSI (m-Translation Scale Invariance) For all a, b ∈ Y m with m ≥ 2, if
a %m b and α ∈ Rm satisfies a+α ∈ Y m and b+α ∈ Y m, then a+α %m b+α.
This axiom says that utility differences can be compared interpersonally. A com-
prehensive treatment of the literature on social choice with interpersonal utility
comparisons can be found in Bossert and Weymark (2004). The following charac-
terization of finite-dimensional utilitarianism is well-known.10
10The argument is due to Milnor (1954) in the context of individual decision under risk. For a
proof in the social choice context, see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002).
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Lemma 6 For all m ∈ N, the utilitarian SWO %Um is equal to %m iff %m satisfies
A, P and TSI.
Let % be an SWR defined on X. Consider the following axiom on %.
Axiom FTSI (Finite Translation Scale Invariance) For all x, y ∈ X with some
subset N ⊂ N such that xi = yi for all i ∈ N\N , if x % y and α ∈ RN satisfies that
x+α ∈ X and y +α ∈ X and αi = 0 for all i ∈ N\N , then x+α % y +α.
By means of this axiom we can characterize the class of SWRs extending %U2 :
Proposition 1 Let {%Um}∞m=2 be the utilitarian sequence of SWOs for each m ≥ 2.
Then:
(i) If % is an SWR on X that extends %U2 , then % satisfies FA, FP and FTSI.
(ii) If % satisfies FA, FP and FTSI, then % is an SWR on X that extends %Um
for every m ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. (Proof of (i): % is an SWR on X that extends %U2
only if % satisfies FA, FP and FTSI.) Assume % is an SWR on X that extends
%U2 . It follows from Lemma 2 that % satisfies FA and FP. To show that % satisfies
FTSI, consider x, y ∈ X for which there exists some subset N ⊂ N such that xi = yi
for all i ∈ N\N , and α ∈ RN which satisfies x+α ∈ X and y +α ∈ X and αk = 0
for all i ∈ N\N . Since % extends %U2 and satisfies FP, it follows from Lemma 8 of
the appendix that x % y iff σ(xN ) ≥ σ(yN ) and x + α % y + α iff σ(xN + αN ) ≥
σ(yN +αN ). Clearly, σ(xN ) ≥ σ(yN ) implies σ(xN +αN ) ≥ σ(yN +αN ), thereby
establishing that % satisfies FTSI.
(Proof (ii): % is an SWR on X that extends %Um if % satisfies FA, FP and
FTSI.) Assume that % satisfies FA, FP and FTSI. Fix z ∈ X and M ∈ N with
|M | = m ≥ 2. Construct %zm as follows: xM %zm yM iff (xM , zN\M ) % (yM , zN\M ).
Since % satisfies FA, FP and FTSI, it follows that %zm satisfies A, P and TSI.
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Thus, by Lemma 6, %Um is equal to %zm. Since z ∈ X and M ∈ N with |M | = m are
arbitrarily chosen, it follows that % extends %Um.
Proposition 1 implies the following result, which makes Theorem 1 applicable in
the utilitarian case.
Proposition 2 The sequence of utilitarian SWOs, {%Um}∞m=2, is proliferating.
Proposition 2 is established by d’Aspremont (2007, Lemma 4) in the case where
Y = R. In the appendix we provide a direct proof of Proposition 2 in the present
case where Y ⊆ R is an interval satisfying [0, 1] ⊆ Y .
Since, by Proposition 2, {%Um}∞m=2 is proliferating, we can now state the following
specialization of generalized time-invariant overtaking.
Definition 3 (Utilitarian time-invariant overtaking) The utilitarian time-in-
variant overtaking criterion %UI satisfies, for all x, y ∈ X,
x %UI y iff there existsM ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that σ(xN ) ≥ σ(yN ) for all N ⊇M.
By Propositions 1 and 2, the following characterization of utilitarian time-invari-
ant overtaking is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 4:
Corollary 1 (i) %UI is an SWR that satisfies PI, SP and ST.
(ii) An SWR % satisfies FA, FP, FTSI and IPC iff %UI is a subrelation to %.
(iii) For all x, y ∈ X, x UI y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
σ(xN ) > σ(yN ) for all N ⊇M .
(iv) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∼UI y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
σ(xN ) = σ(yN ) for all N ⊇M .
To facilitate its use, we provide a characterization of the asymmetric and sym-
metric parts of the utilitarian generalized overtaking criterion.
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Proposition 3 Utilitarian time-invariant overtaking satisfies:
(i) For all x, y ∈ X, x UI y iff there exists M+ ⊆ {i ∈ N | xi− yi > 0} such that
σ(xM+∪M−) > σ(yM+∪M−) for all M− ⊆ {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0}.
(ii) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∼UI y iff M+ := {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} and M− := {i ∈ N |
xi − yi < 0} are finite sets satisfying σ(xM+∪M−) = σ(yM+∪M−).
Proof. (If part of (i).) Assume that there exists M+ ⊆ {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0}
such that σ(xM+∪M−) > σ(yM+∪M−) for all M− ⊆ {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0}. Let
M = M+ and choose N ⊇ M . We can partition N into A := {i ∈ N | xi − yi ≥ 0}
and M− := {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0}, implying that xi − yi ≥ 0 for all A\M+. Hence,
σ(xN )− σ(yN ) = σ(xA∪M−)− σ(yA∪M−) ≥ σ(xM+∪M−)− σ(yM+∪M−) > 0 ,
where the partitioning of N into A and M− implies the first equality, xi − yi ≥ 0
for all A\M+ implies the second weak inequality, and the premise implies the third
strong inequality.
(Only-if part of (i).) Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
σ(xN ) > σ(yN ) for all N ⊇ M . Let M+ := M ∩ {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} and choose
M− ⊆ {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0}. Note that xi ≤ yi for all i ∈M\(M+ ∩M−). Hence,
σ(xM+∪M−)− σ(yM+∪M−) ≥ σ(xM∪M−)− σ(yM∪M−) > 0
by the premise since M ∪M− ⊇M .
(If part of Part (ii).) Assume that M+ := {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} and M− :=
{i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0} are finite sets satisfying σ(xM+∪M−) = σ(yM+∪M−). Let
M =M+ ∪M− and choose N ⊇M . Since xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M , it follows that
σ(xN )− σ(yN ) = σ(xM )− σ(yM ) = σ(xM+∪M−)− σ(yM+∪M−) = 0
by the premise.
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(Only-if part of (ii).) Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such
that σ(xN ) = σ(yN ) for all N ⊇ M . By Lemma 3(ii) and the fact that {%Um}∞t=2
is proliferating, it follows that xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M . Hence, M+ := {i ∈
N | xi − yi > 0} and M− := {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0} are finite sets satisfying
σ(xM+∪M−) = σ(yM+∪M−).
The if parts can easily be amended to ensure that |M | ≥ 2.
This characterization can be illustrated by the (u,v) example of Section 1. In
this example {i ∈ N | ui − vi > 0} = {1} and {i ∈ N | ui − vi < 0} = N\{1}. By
choosingM+ = {1} so that σ(uM+)−σ(vM+) = 2, and noting σ(uM−)−σ(vM−) < 1
for all M− ⊂ N\{1}, it follows from Proposition 3(i) that u UI v.
The utilitarian criterion proposed by Basu and Mitra (2007a), which we discussed
in Section 1 and denote %UF (cf. the notation of Section 4), yields comparability only
if there is equality or Pareto-dominance on a cofinite set:
x %UF y iff there exists N ⊂ N such that σ(xN ) ≥ σ(yN ) and xN\N ≥ yN\N .
It follows from Proposition 3 that %UF is a subrelation to %UI , since the symmetric
parts, ∼UI and ∼UF , coincide, while UI strictly expands UF , as illustrated by the
(u,v) example of Section 1.
6.2 The Leximin Case
To state a precise definition of the leximin order we introduce additional notation.
For any xM , (x(1), . . . , x(|M |)) denotes the rank-ordered permutation of xM such that
x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(|M |), ties being broken arbitrarily. For all xM and yM , xM L|M | yM
iff there exists m ∈ {1, . . . , |M |} such that x(k) = y(k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and
x(m) > y(m) and xM ∼L|M | yM iff x(k) = y(k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |M |}.
We first recall through Lemma 7 below a standard characterization of finite-
dimensional leximin using the Hammond (1976) Equity axiom. This axiom states,
in our intergenerational context, that if there is a conflict between two generations,
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with every other generation being as well off in the compared profiles, then society
should weakly prefer the profile where the least favored generation is better off.
Axiom m-HE (m-Hammond Equity) For all a, b ∈ Y m with m ≥ 2, if there exist
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that bi > ai > aj > bj and ak = bk for all k 6= i, j, then
a %m b.
Lemma 7 For all m ∈ N, the leximin SWO %Lm is equal to %m iff %m satisfies A,
P and HE.
Let % be an SWR defined on X. Consider also the HE axiom on %.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there exist i, j ∈ N such that
yi > xi > xj > yj and xk = yk for all k 6= i, j, then x % y.
By means of this axiom we can characterize the class of SWRs extending %L2 :
Proposition 4 Let {%Lm}∞m=2 be the leximin sequence of SWOs for each m ≥ 2.
Then:
(i) If % is an SWR on X that extends %L2 , then % satisfies FA, FP and HE.
(ii) If % satisfies FA, FP and HE, then % is an SWR on X that extends %Lm for
every m ≥ 2.
Proof. (Proof of (i): % is an SWR on X that extends %L2 only if % satisfies FA,
FP and HE.) Assume % is an SWR on X that extends %L2 . It follows from Lemma
2 that % satisfies FA and FP. To show that % satisfies HE, let x, y ∈ X satisfy
that there exist i, j ∈ N such that yi > xi > xj > yj and xk = yk for all k 6= i, j.
Then x{i,j} %L2 y{i,j} (since %L2 satisfies 2-HE) and x % y (since % extends %L2 ).
This establishes that % satisfies HE.
(Proof of (ii): % is an SWR on X that extends %Lm if % satisfies FA, FP and
HE.) Assume that % satisfies FA, FP and HE. Fix z ∈ X and M ∈ N with
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|M | = m ≥ 2. Construct %zm as follows: xM %zm yM iff (xM , zN\M ) % (yM , zN\M ).
Since % satisfies FA, FP and HE, it follows that %zm satisfies A, P and m-HE.
Thus, by Lemma 7, %Lm is equal to %zm. Since z ∈ X and M ∈ N with |M | = m are
arbitrarily chosen, it follows that % extends %Lm.
Proposition 4 implies the following result, which makes Theorem 1 applicable in
the utilitarian case.
Proposition 5 The sequence of leximin SWOs, {%Lm}∞m=2, is proliferating.
d’Aspremont (2007, Lemma 5) proves Proposition 5 through a direct argument
which is applicable also to the present case where Y ⊆ R is an interval satisfying
[0, 1] ⊆ Y .
Since, by Proposition 5, {%Lm}∞m=2 is proliferating, we can now state the following
specialization of generalized time-invariant overtaking.
Definition 4 (Leximin time-invariant overtaking) The leximin time-invariant
overtaking criterion %LI satisfies, for all x, y ∈ X,
x %LI y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that xN %L|N | yN for all N ⊇M.
By Propositions 4 and 5, the following characterization of leximin time-invariant
overtaking is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 4:
Corollary 2 (i) %LI is an SWR that satisfies PI, SP and ST.
(ii) An SWR % satisfies FA, FP, HE and IPC iff %LI is a subrelation to %.
(iii) For all x, y ∈ X, x LI y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN L|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
(iv) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∼LI y iff there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN ∼L|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
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We provide a characterization of the asymmetric and symmetric parts of the
leximin generalized overtaking criterion. For this purpose, we need some additional
notation. Let N be the class of all cofinite subsets of N. We denote the set of all
utility streams defined on some element of N and taking values in Y by Xc. Since a
utility stream can be viewed as a function from the domain of generations to the set
Y , we can formally write Xc := {x : Nx → Y |Nx ∈ N}. Observe that for x ∈ Xc,
we denote that cofinite subset of N which is the domain of x by Nx.
For any x ∈ Xc, write Nxmin := {i ∈ Nx | xi = infj∈Nx xj}. Say that x ∈ Xc
and y ∈ Xc have the same minimum and the same number of minimal elements if
infj∈Nxxj = infj∈Nyyj and 0 < |Nxmin| = |Nymin| <∞.
Define the operator R : (Xc)2 → (Xc)2 as follows, where x′ denotes the restric-
tion of x to Nx\Nxmin and y′ is restriction of y to Ny\Nymin if x ∈ Xc and y ∈ Xc
satisfy that |Nxmin| and |Nymin| are positive and finite:
R(x,y) =

(x′,y′) if x and y have the same minimum and
the same number of minimal elements,
(x,y) otherwise.
Write R0(x,y) := (x,y) and, for n ∈ N, Rn(x,y) := R(Rn−1(x,y)).
Proposition 6 Leximin time-invariant overtaking satisfies:
(i) For all x, y ∈ X, x LI y iff
(a) there is P ∈ F such that Px > y, or
(b) there exists m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ m and one of
following is true:
infj∈Nx′x
′
j > infj∈Ny′y
′
j
infj∈Nx′x
′
j = infj∈Ny′y
′
j and 0 ≤ |Nx
′
min| < |Ny
′
min| ≤ ∞.
(ii) For all x, y ∈ X, x ∼LI y iff there is P ∈ F such that Px = y.
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Proof. Write (xn,yn) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ 0.
(If part of (i).) First assume that there is P ∈ F such that Px > y. By the
definition of %L|M |, there exists M ⊂ N such that xM L|M | yM and xi ≥ yi for all
i ∈ N\M . Hence, xN L|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
Then assume that there exists m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ m.
Let m be the smallest such integer. Then, for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}, xk and yk have
the same minimum and the same number of minimal elements. Write
My :=
⋃
k∈{0,...,m−1}N
yk
min .
If infj∈Nx′x
′
j > infj∈Ny′y
′
j , choose i
′ ∈ Ny′ so that y′i′ < infj∈Nx′x′j . Let M =
My ∪ {i′}. Then xN L|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . If infj∈Nx′x′j = infj∈Ny′y′j and
0 ≤ |Nx′min| < |Ny
′
min| ≤ ∞, let Ny
′
be a subset of Ny
′
min with a larger number of
elements than Nx′min. Let M =My ∪Ny
′
. Then xN L|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
(Only-if part of (i).) Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN L|N | yN for all N ⊇ M . Suppose that (a) and (b) are not true. We must show
that, for all M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2, there exists N ⊇M such that xN -L|N | yN .
Suppose there is no P ∈ F such that Px > y, and there exists no m such that
(x′,y′n(x,y) for all n ≥ m. Then, for all n ≥ 0, xn and yn have the same minimum
and the same number of minimal elements, and
⋃
n≥0N
yn
min is an infinite set. For
any M ⊂ N, one can choose N ⊇ M such that N contains at least as many Nxnmin
elements as Ny
n
min elements for any n ≥ 0, and more for some n′. Then xN ≺L|N | yN .
Suppose there is no P ∈ F such that Px > y and that, even though there exists
m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ m and infj∈Nx′x′j = infj∈Ny′y′j , we have
that |Nx′min| = |Ny
′
min| =∞. Letm be the smallest such integer. Independently of how
My is complemented to form M ⊂ N, one can always choose N ⊇ M such that N
in addition to including
⋃
k∈{0,...,m−1}Nx
k
min contains more Nx
′
min elements than N
y′
min
elements. Then xN ≺L|N | yN .
Suppose there is no P ∈ F such that Px > y and that, even though there exists
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m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ m and infj∈Nx′x′j = infj∈Ny′y′j , we have
that |Nx′min| = |Ny
′
min| = 0. Let m be the smallest such integer. Independently of how
My is complemented to formM ⊂ N, one can always choose N ⊇M such that N in
addition to including
⋃
k∈{0,...,m−1}Nx
k
min contains i
′ ∈ Nx′ so that x′i′ < minj∈N∩Ny′y′j .
Then xN ≺L|N | yN .
Suppose that, even though there exists m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all
n ≥ m, we have that (1) infj∈Nx′x′j < infj∈Ny′y′j or (2) infj∈Nx′x′j = infj∈Ny′y′j and
∞ ≥ |Nx′min| > |Ny
′
min| ≥ 0. Then there is no P ∈ F such that Px > y, and it follows
from the if-part above that x ≺LI y.
(If part of (ii).) Assume that there is P ∈ F such that Px = y. By the definition
of %L|M |, there exists M ⊂ N such that xM ∼L|M | yM and xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M .
Hence, xN ∼L|N | yN for all N ⊇M .
(Only-if part (ii).) Assume that there exists M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2 such that
xN ∼L|N | yN for all N ⊇M . By Lemma 3(ii) and the fact that {%Lm}∞t=2 is prolifer-
ating, it follows that xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M . It now follows from the definition of
%L|M | that there is P ∈ F such that Px = y.
The if parts can easily be amended to ensure that |M | ≥ 2.
This characterization can be illustrated by the (u,v) example of Section 1. In
this example Nu = Nv = N and infj∈N uj > infj∈N vj so that u and v do not have
the same minimum, implying that (u,v) = Rn(u,v) for all n ≥ 1. By Proposition
6(i)(b) it follows that u LI v.
To illustrate part (i) of Proposition 6 further, we also consider the comparison
of v of Section 1 to
w : −1 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . .
Then v and w have the same minimum and the same number of minimal element,
implying that (v′,w′) = R(v,w) with v′ and w′ being the restrictions of v and w to
N\{1}. Furthermore, infj∈N\{1}v′j = infj∈N\{1}w′j = 0 and 0 = |Nv
′
min| < |Nw
′
min| =∞.
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This entails that (v′,w′) = Rn(v,w) for all n ≥ 1. By Proposition 6(i)(b) it follows
that v LI w.
The leximin criterion proposed by Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007),
which we discussed in Section 1 and denote %LF (cf. the notation of Section 4),
yields comparability only if there is equality or Pareto-dominance on a cofinite set:
x %LF y iff there exists N ⊂ N such that xN %L|N | yN and xN\N ≥ yN\N .
It follows from Proposition 6 that %LF is a subrelation to %LI , since the symmetric
parts, ∼LI and ∼LF , coincide, while LI strictly expands LF , as illustrated by the
(u,v) example of Section 1.
7 Discussion
We have defined the generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion %∗I . This cri-
terion can be specialized in various cases, corresponding to different moral values
theories, as long as these theories are specified by a proliferating sequence of Paretian
SWOs. In the utilitarian and leximin cases it leads to %UI and %LI . We have shown
that through %UI and %LI we can expand the asymmetric parts of the utilitarian
and leximin criteria suggested by Basu and Mitra (2007a) and Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2007), %UF and %LF respectively, without compromising desirable
properties like Stationarity (ST) and Strong Relative Anonymity (PI).
When evaluating the merit of this exercise one should keep in mind that it is
the expansion of the asymmetric part that matters if one seeks to reduce the set of
maximal elements for a given class of feasible infinite utility streams. In this section
we analyze whether further expansions of the asymmetric part are compatible with
PI, before discussing the earlier and related contributions by Vallentyne and Kagan
(1997) and Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004) for finitely additive moral value theories.
Fix a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗m}∞m=2. Note that Lemmas
3(ii) and 4(ii) imply that the symmetric part of %∗I coincides with the symmetric
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parts of %∗F and %∗. Since %∗ is a subrelation to any SWR extending %∗m for
every m ≥ 2, it follows that the asymmetric part of %∗I cannot be expanded at the
expense of its symmetric part. The asymmetric part of %∗I can only be expanded by
making comparable pairs of utility streams which %∗I does not rank. The following
proposition characterizes the pairs of utility streams that %∗I does not rank.
Proposition 7 Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with, for each
m ≥ 2, %∗m satisfying axiom P. Then, for all x, y ∈ X, the following two statements
are equivalent:
(1) %∗I deems x and y as incomparable, i.e., ¬(x %∗I y) and ¬(x -∗I y).
(2) (i) There exists P+ ∈ P such that x+ = P+x and y+ = P+y satisfy that
x+{1,...,n} ∗n y+{1,...,n} for all n ∈ N.
(ii) There exists P− ∈ P such that x− = P−x and y− = P−y satisfy that
x−{1,...,n} ≺∗n y−{1,...,n} for all n ∈ N.
Proof. (1) implies (2). Let {%∗m}∞m=2 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian
SWOs. Assume that ¬(x %∗I y) and ¬(x -∗I y). Since, for each m ∈ N, %∗m is
complete, by Definition 2 it is a fact that, for all M ⊂ N with |M | ≥ 2, there exist
N ′, N ′′ ⊇M such that xN ′ ∗|N ′| yN ′ and xN ′′ ≺∗|N ′′| yN ′′ .
Part (i). By this fact, a sequence 〈Ni〉i∈N can be constructed inductively as
follows: Let m1 = 2. For i ∈ N, let Ni ⊇ {1, . . . ,mi} and mi+1 ∈ N satisfy that
xNi ∗|Ni| yNi and {1, . . . ,mi+1} ) Ni. Clearly, 〈Ni〉i∈N satisfies, for all i ∈ N,
∅ 6= {1, . . . ,mi} ⊆ Ni ( {1, . . . ,mi+1} ⊆ Ni+1 ⊂ N and
⋃
i∈NNi = N. Let M1 = N1
and, for i ≥ 2, Mi = Ni\Ni−1, implying that {M1,M2, . . . ,Mi, . . . } is a partition of
N. Write n0 = 0 and, for all i ∈ N, ni = |Ni|. Since, for all i ∈ N, |Mi| = ni − ni−1,
and {{n0 + 1, . . . , n1}, {n1 + 1, . . . , n2}, . . . , {ni−1 + 1, . . . , ni}, . . . } is a partition of
N, we can construct P+ ∈ P as follows, writing x+ = P+x and y+ = P+y: For all
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i ∈ N, elements in Mi are mapped onto {ni−1 + 1, . . . , ni} such that
x+ni−1+1 − y+ni−1+1 ≥ x+ni−1+2 − y+ni−1+2 ≥ · · · ≥ x+ni−1 − y+ni−1 ≥ x+ni − y+ni .
We must establish that, for each i ∈ N, x+{1,...,m} ∗m y+{1,...,m} for all m ∈
{ni−1 + 1, . . . , ni}. For each i ∈ N, this is shown by induction. Since xNi ∗ni yNi ,
it follows by axiom I and the properties of P+ that x+{1,...,ni} ∗ni y
+
{1,...,ni}. Assume
that x+{1,...,m} ∗m y+{1,...,m} for all m ∈ {`+1, . . . ni}, where ` ∈ {ni−1+1, . . . ni−1}.
The inductive proof is completed by showing that x+{1,...,`} ∗` y+{1,...,`}.
If x+`+1 > y
+
`+1, then x
+
{ni−1+1,...,`} > y
+
{ni−1+1,...,`} by the properties of P
+. If
i = 1, so that ni−1 + 1 = n0 + 1 = 1, then axiom P implies x+{1,...,`} ∗` y+{1,...,`}. If
i ≥ 2, then xNi−1 ∗ni−1 yNi−1 , and axiom I and the properties of P+ imply that
x+{1,...,ni−1} ∗ni−1 y
+
{1,...,ni−1}. Hence, it follows from axiom P and Lemma 3(i) that
x+{1,...,`} ∗`
(
x+{1,...,ni−1},y
+
{ni−1+1,...,`}
) ∗` y+{1,...,`} .
If x+`+1 ≤ y+`+1, then axiom P implies that(
x+{1,...,`}, y
+
`+1
)
%∗`+1 x+{1,...,`+1} ∗`+1 y+{1,...,`+1} .
It now follows from Lemma 3(i) that x+{1,...,`} ∗` y+{1,...,`}.
Part (ii) follows by interchanging the roles of x and y.
(2) implies (1). This follows directly from Definition 2 and the fact that %∗I
satisfies PI (cf. Theorem 1(i)).
Proposition 7 yields the following conclusion: If an SWR % to which %∗I is a
subrelation strictly ranks a utility pair x and y deemed incomparable by %∗I , then
% cannot both satisfy axiom PI and be determined from the sequence of finite-
dimensional Paretian SWOs by means of an overtaking procedure.
By Proposition 3, in the utilitarian case an incomparable pair of utility streams,
x and y, satisfies that the sets of positive differences, {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0}, and
negative differences, {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0}, are both infinite, and either (i) the sum
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of the positive differences and the sum of the negative differences both diverge, or
(ii) the sum of the positive differences converges to σ+x−y ∈ (0,∞) and the sum of
the negative differences converges to σ−x−y ∈ (−∞, 0), with σ+x−y + σ−x−y = 0.
By Proposition 6, in the leximin case an incomparable pair of utility streams, x
and y, satisfies that (a) there is no P ∈ F such that Px ≥ y or Px ≤ y and (b) there
exists m such that (x′,y′) = Rn(x,y) for all n ≥ m and infj∈Nx′x′j = infj∈Ny′y′j with
the sets Nx′min and N
y′
min both being empty or infinite.
Axiom IPC has earlier been proposed by Vallentyne and Kagan (1997, p. 10)
under the name of RSBI (‘rejected strengthened basic idea’) and applied to the utili-
tarian case. The utilitarian SWR generated by RSBI coincides with the asymmetric
part of the utilitarian time-invariant overtaking criterion %UI . Vallentyne and Kagan
(1997, p. 10–11) reject RSBI in favor of SBI1 (‘strengthened basic idea 1’), which is
equivalent to Lauwers and Vallentyne’s (2004) “Differential Betterness” principle.
As shown by Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004), the utilitarian SWR generated by
SBI1 ranks x above y iff the sum of the positive differences converges to σ+x−y and
the sum of the negative differences converges to σ−x−y, with σ
+
x−y+σ
−
x−y > 0, or the
sum of positive difference diverges and the sum of negative difference converges. In
both cases, %UI makes the same rankings.
It differs from %UI in the case where the sum of the positive differences converges
to σ+x−y and the sum of the negative differences converges to σ
−
x−y, with σ
+
x−y +
σ−x−y = 0. In this case, the utilitarian SWR generated by SBI1 yields no ranking.
In contrast, it follows from Proposition 3 that
(1) x UI y if {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} is finite and {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0} is infinite,
(2) x ∼UI y if {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} and {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0} are both finite,
(3) x ≺UI y if {i ∈ N | xi − yi > 0} is infinite and {i ∈ N | xi − yi < 0} is finite,
(4) x and y are incomparable by%UI if {i ∈ N | xi−yi > 0} and {i ∈ N | xi−yi < 0}
are both infinite; this follows from Proposition 7.
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However, Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004) introduce a second principle, “Differential
Indifference”, which for each of these sub-cases deems x indifferent to y.
To illustrate this difference, compare stream u of the introduction with
(0,u) : 0 1 12
1
4
1
8
1
16 . . .
1
2n−2 . . .
By choosing M+ = {1}, it follows from Proposition 3(i) that u UI (0,u). However,
σ+u−(0,u) = 1 and σ
−
u−(0,u) = −1. Hence, σ+u−(0,u) + σ−u−(0,u) = 0, implying that an
SWR satisfying Differential Indifference deems u and (0,u) indifferent.
Hence, by deeming two streams indifferent when the sum of differences is uncon-
ditionally convergent and converges to zero, Differential Indifference reduces incom-
parability of a utilitarian SWR to the case where the sum of the positive differences
and the sum of the negative differences both diverge. However, it also reduces the
asymmetric part of the utilitarian time-invariant overtaking criterion and may thus
increase the set of maximal elements. Furthermore, it is not clear how to adapt this
principle to a generalized infinite-dimensional criterion obtained from some prolifer-
ating sequence of Paretian finite-dimensional SWOs, thus making it compatible with
our purpose: to develop a generalized criterion that allows for non-additive moral
value theories and different interpretations for the locations of values.
Appendix
Lemma 8 Let the SWR % extends %U2 . If x, u ∈ X satisfy that there exists N ⊂ N
such that ui = σ(xN )/|N | for i ∈ N and ui = xi for i ∈ N\N , then x ∼ u.
Proof. The result is shown by induction. Consider the statement that x ∼ u
whenever x, u ∈ X satisfy that there exists N ⊂ N such that ui = σ(xN )/|N | for
i ∈ N and ui = xi for i ∈ N\N .
33
This statement is true for all N ⊂ N with |N | = 1 by the reflexivity of %.
Assume that the statement is true for all M ⊂ N with |M | ≤ m. It remains to
be shown that then the statement is true for all N ⊂ N with |N | = m+ 1, provided
that % extends %U2 . This is shown in the remainder of the proof.
Suppose u ∈ X satisfy that there exists N ⊂ N such that ui = σ(xN )/|N | for
i ∈ N and ui = xi for i ∈ N\N , where |N | = m+ 1. W.l.o.g., N = {1, . . . ,m+ 1}.
Consider any M ⊂ N such that M ⊂ N and |M | = m. W.l.o.g., M = {1, . . . ,m}.
Construct v ∈ X by vi = σ(xM )/|M | for i ∈M and vi = xi for i ∈ N\M .
Let the sequence {yk}mk=0, where yk ∈ X for each k, be constructed as follows:
ykM =

vM for k = 0
(u{1,...,k}, v{k+1,...,m}) for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1
uM for k = m,
while for all k, ykm+1 = x
k
m+1+k(v1−u1), and yki = ui for i ∈ N\N . Then yk−1 ∼ yk
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} by the property that % extends %U2 , since yk−1k +yk−1m+1 = ykk+ykm+1
and yk−1i = y
k
i for i ∈ N\{k,m + 1}. By transitivity, v = y0 ∼ ym = u. By
assumption, x ∼ v, leading by transitivity to the conclusion that x ∼ u.
Direct proof of Proposition 2. Assume that the SWR % extends %U2 . We
must show that % extends %Um for all m ≥ 2. Consider x, y ∈ X for which there
exists some subset M ⊂ N such that xi = yi for all i ∈ N\M .
If xM ∼U|M | yM , then σ(xM ) = σ(yM ) and, by Lemma 8, x ∼ u ∼ y, where
ui = σ(xM )/|M | for i ∈M and ui = xi for i ∈ N\M . By transitivity, x ∼ y.
If xM U|M | yM , then σ(xM ) > σ(yM ) and, by Lemma 8 and FP, x ∼ u  v ∼
y, where ui = σ(xM )/|M | and vi = σ(yM )/|M | for i ∈M and ui = vi = xi = yi for
i ∈ N\M . By transitivity, x  y.
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